Consumers and agency problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Prendergast, C
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00023
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: C34-C51
• 关键词: Incentives

摘要

Consumers solve many agency problems, by pointing out when they believe that agelits have made mistakes. I consider the role that consumers play in inducing efficient behaviour by. agents. I distinguish case, where consumers have. similar preferences to the principal from those where they diverge. In the former case, allowing consumer feedback improves allocaticons, and increasing consumer information is unambiguously beneficial. Where consumers disagree with principals over desired outcomers which characterises many public sector benefits,, consumers' feedback about the performance of agemts can reduce wellfare. This may result in efficiently restricting the ability of consumers to complain about agent performance.