Fair procedures: Evidence from games involving lotteries

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bolton, GE; Brandts, J; Ockenfels, A
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01032.x
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 1054-1076
• 关键词: ultimatum games; RECIPROCITY; INFORMATION; PUNISHMENT; BEHAVIOR

摘要

Procedures are the area where fairness arguably has its largest influence on modern societies. The experiments we report provide an initial characterisation of that influence and suggest new interpretations for some well-known results. We find that procedural fairness is conceptually distinct from allocation fairness, although the evidence also indicates that the two are linked in important ways. Post hoc extension of one of the current models of fairness illustrates this link and implies that a deeper understanding of procedural fairness will require investigation of competing fairness norms.