Strategic complementarities and the twin crises

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goldstein, I
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.00993.x
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 368-390
• 关键词: Financial crises; currency crises; global games; Bank runs; equilibrium; balance; MODEL; fragility; ATTACKS

摘要

The economic literature emphasised the role of strategic complementarities in generating banking crises and currency crises. Motivated by evidence from recent financial crises, we study a model, where strategic complementarities exist, not only within a group of creditors or within a group of currency speculators, but also between the two groups. The additional type of complementarities generates a vicious circle between banking crises and currency crises. This magnifies the correlation between the two crises and destabilises the economy. We show that, due to the vicious circle, a Lender of Last Resort might not be able to prevent bank runs.