Can private learn from public governance?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Frey, BS; Benz, M
• 署名单位: University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01041.x
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: F377-F396
• 关键词: board composition; one vote; firm; CONSEQUENCES; incentives; OWNERSHIP; RIGHTS; income; share

摘要

Corporate governance is importantly based on agency theory and relies on extrinsic incentives to align the interests of managers, employees and shareholders. This article argues that in view of recent corporate scandals, private governance can learn from public governance: (1) Goal-oriented intrinsic motivation of agents should be supported by fixed incomes and an extensive selection process of employees; (2) Extrinsic, but non-monetary incentives (e.g. conferring orders and titles) can be used; (3) The power of actors should be restricted by a clear division of power, appropriate rules of succession and institutionalised competition for positions in firms.