Joint liability lending and the peer selection effect
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Gangopadhyay, S; Ghatak, M; Lensink, R
署名单位：
University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Groningen; University of Nottingham
刊物名称：
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ISSN/ISSBN：
0013-0133
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01029.x
发表日期：
2005
页码：
1005-1015
关键词：
摘要：
We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in Ghatak (2000) violate an ex post incentive-compatibility constraint which says that the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterise optimal separating joint liability contracts incorporating this constraint.
来源URL：