The dynamics of statistical discrimination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blume, Lawrence E.
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01133.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: F480-F498
• 关键词: model

摘要

This article demonstrates how learning dynamics select among equilibria in a statistical discrimination model of employment. The static market model exhibits multiple equilibria. The belief revision dynamics generate a Markov market process which, in the long run, is mostly near one and only one of the static equilibria, regardless of initial conditions. Usually policy effects appear in comparative statics, where the equilibrium set moves with different policies. But here policy is also seen to effect which equilibrium is selected even when it has no comparative statics effect at all.