Entry and strategic information display in credit markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bouckaert, Jan; Degryse, Hans
• 署名单位: University of Antwerp; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01107.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 702-720
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; adverse selection; COMPETITION; switch

摘要

In many countries, lenders voluntarily provide information about their borrowers to private credit registries. A recent World Bank survey reveals that the display of a lender's own borrower information is often not reciprocated. That is, access to these registries does not require the prior provision of proprietary data. We argue that incumbent lenders release information about a portion of their profitable borrowers for strategic reasons. The reasoning is that the pool of unreleased borrowers becomes characterised by a severe adverse selection problem. This prevents the entrants from bidding for all the incumbent's profitable borrowers and reduces their scale of entry.