Welfare work requirements with paternalistic government preferences

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Moffitt, Robert
• 署名单位: Johns Hopkins University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01131.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: F441-F458
• 关键词: income-maintenance; tax; program

摘要

Work requirements in means-tested transfer programmes have grown in importance in the US and in some other countries. The theoretical literature which considers their possible optimality generally operates within a traditional welfarist framework where some function of the utility of the poor is maximised. Here we consider a case where society instead has preferences over the actual work allocations of welfare recipients. Optimality of work requirements is shown to be possible but depends on the accuracy of the screening mechanism which assigns work requirements. Numerical simulations show that accuracy must be high for optimality. Earnings subsidies may also be optimal.