Company dividends and ownership structure: Evidence from UK panel data

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Khan, T
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01082.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: C172-C189
• 关键词: agency costs

摘要

This study investigates the relationship between dividends and ownership structure for a panel of 330 large quoted UK firms. Controlling for unobserved firm-specific effects, results indicate a negative relationship between dividends and ownership concentration. Ownership composition also matters, with a positive relationship observed for shareholding by insurance companies, and a negative one for individuals. These results are consistent with agency models in which dividends substitute for poor monitoring by a firm's shareholders but can also be explained by the presence of powerful principals who are able to impose their preferred payout policy upon firms.