Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase theorem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderlini, L; Felli, L
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01054.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 223-245
• 关键词: PROPERTY-RIGHTS; RENEGOTIATION; implementation; OWNERSHIP; CONTRACTS

摘要

This paper explores the extent to which ex ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify the basic 'hold-up problem' that arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay ex ante costs for the negotiation to take place. We then show that a 'Coasian solution' to this problem is not available: a Coasian solution typically entails a negotiation about the payment of the costs associated with the future negotiation, which in turn is associated with a fresh set of ex ante costs, and hence a new hold-up problem.