Optimal degree of public information dissemination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank
• 署名单位: Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg; Technical University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02139.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 718-742
• 关键词: actually pro-transparency; unique equilibrium; monetary-policy; social value; shin 2002; COORDINATION; PRIVATE; COMMUNICATION; morris; games

摘要

Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterised by positive externalities. In these environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare: public announcements serve as focal points for higher-order beliefs and affect agents' behaviour more than justified by their informational contents. Some scholars conclude that reducing public signals' precision or entirely withholding information may improve welfare. This article shows that public information should always be provided with maximum precision but, under certain conditions, not to all agents. Restricting the degree of publicity is a better-suited instrument for preventing the negative welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are.