Glass ceilings or sticky floors? Statistical discrimination in a dynamic model of hiring and promotion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bjerk, David
• 署名单位: Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; Claremont McKenna College
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02157.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 961-982
• 关键词: sex-discrimination; gender wage; female; differentials; INFORMATION; pay

摘要

I show that when two groups differ in (i) their average skill level, (ii) the precision with which they can signal their skill prior to entering the labour market, and/or (iii) the frequency with which they have the opportunity to signal their skill prior to entering the labour market, then even if firms become increasingly informed regarding each worker's skill over time, equally skilled workers from different groups will have different likelihoods of making it to top jobs in the economy, even though there is no discrimination when it comes to promotion to these top jobs.