Games parents and adolescents play: Risky behaviour, parental reputation and strategic transfers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hao, Lingxin; Hotz, V. Joseph; Jin, Ginger Z.
• 署名单位: Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Johns Hopkins University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02132.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 515-555
• 关键词: rotten-kid theorem; household; CHILDREN; FAMILY; CONSEQUENCES; childbearing; birth; time

摘要

This article examines parental reputation formation in intra-familial interactions. In a repeated two-stage game, children decide whether to drop out of high school or daughters decide whether to have births as teens and parents then decide whether to provide support to their children beyond age 18. Drawing on Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982), we show that, under certain conditions, parents have the incentive to penalise older children for their adolescent risk-taking behaviour in order to dissuade their younger children from such behaviour when reaching adolescence. We find evidence in favour of this parental reputation model.