A theory of distributional conflict, voluntarism and segregation

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Horstmann, Ignatius J.; Scharf, Kimberley A.
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02128.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 427-453
• 关键词: private provision; property-values; public good; Tiebout; equilibrium; taxes; redistribution; capitalization; preferences; COMPETITION

摘要

Along with the rise in income inequality in the US, there is evidence of a simultaneous move towards fiscal devolution and increased government reliance on private provision of public goods. This article argues that these phenomena are related. We describe a model of jurisdiction and policy formation in which the structure of government provision is endogenous and public good provision levels are determined by a political process that can exploit private motives for voluntary giving. The model predicts that an increase in income inequality leads to decentralisation, with local jurisdictions becoming more income-homogeneous than the population as a whole. This reduction in local income heterogeneity, combined with a reduced tax base, results in increased reliance by government on private provision.