Stackelberg competition with endogenous entry
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Etro, Federico
署名单位：
University of Milano-Bicocca
刊物名称：
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ISSN/ISSBN：
0013-0133
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02185.x
发表日期：
2008
页码：
1670-1697
关键词：
摘要：
I characterise endogenous market structures where leaders have a first-mover advantage and entry is endogenous. Leaders are always more aggressive than the followers, independently from strategic substitutability or complementarity. Under quantity competition, leaders produce more than any follower and I determine the conditions for entry-deterrence (high substitutability and non-increasing marginal costs). Under price competition, leaders set lower prices than the followers (the opposite than with an exogenous number of firms). In contests, leaders invest more than each follower. In all these cases a leadership improves the allocation of resources compared to the Nash equilibrium with endogenous entry.