Private information and altruism in bidding Roscas

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Klonner, Stefan
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02142.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 775-800
• 关键词: credit associations; rotating savings; northern nigeria; rural india; RISK; insurance; ECONOMICS; consumption; allocation; auctions

摘要

This article studies how altruism improves allocations in a private information environment where strategic behaviour reduces economic welfare. A theoretical analysis establishes that, in an environment characterised by uncertainty and private information, outcomes of auctions in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (Roscas) are more efficient when bidders' preferences are altruistic rather than selfish. A semi-parametric structural estimation technique for Rosca auctions is presented. A parametric structural estimation identifies interactions between group characteristics and bidder altruism. It is found that effective leadership and intra-group diversity are associated with a greater extent of bidder altruism and thus more efficient intra-Rosca allocations.