CONTEST EFFORTS IN LIGHT OF BEHAVIOURAL CONSIDERATIONS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baharad, Eyal; Nitzan, Shmuel
• 署名单位: University of Haifa; Bar Ilan University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02201.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 2047-2059
• 关键词: Rent-seeking; strategic behavior; monopoly

摘要

This study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under-dissipation in contests with relatively small number of participants. Such distortion may also result, however, in over-dissipation of the contested rent. Focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and the commonly studied contest success function, our main results clarify under what circumstances (i) rents are more under-dissipated relative to the standard situation where probabilities are not distorted (ii) rents are under-dissipated, yet less intensely relative to the standard situation where probabilities are not distorted (iii) rents are over-dissipated and (iv) the contest does not possess a symmetric interior equilibrium in pure strategies.