BIDDING BEHAVIOUR IN MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS - AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Engelmann, Dirk; Grimm, Veronika
• 署名单位: University of London; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; University of Copenhagen; University of Cologne; University of Erlangen Nuremberg
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02249.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 855-882
• 关键词: uniform-price; demand reduction; bid auction; collusion; equilibrium; Vickrey

摘要

We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. We also test revenue equivalence for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units.