Welfare Measures when Agents can Learn: A Unifying Theory*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhao, Jinhua; Kling, Catherine L.
• 署名单位: Michigan State University; Iowa State University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02272.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1560-1585
• 关键词: COST-BENEFIT-ANALYSIS; consumers-surplus; environmental preservation; contingent valuation; uncertainty; GOODS

摘要

We extend Graham's (1981) welfare analysis under uncertainty to a dynamic environment where the agent can delay and obtain information. The dynamic willingness to pay locus unifies the concepts of option price, dynamic WTP, commitment costs and quasi-option value. Option price (dynamic WTP) corresponds to the ex ante WTP when the agent ignores (recognises) the learning opportunity. The commitment cost, or the difference between option price and dynamic WTP, equals the annualised and monetised quasi-option value. State contingent contracts have added value by allowing trading among agents with heterogeneous access to future information and delay opportunities.