How Pressure Groups Activate Voters and Move Candidates Closer to the Median*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wittman, Donald
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02273.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1324-1343
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; campaign; ELECTIONS

摘要

This article shows how uninformed but rational voters can respond intelligently to political advertising. The article models a situation where a candidate must rely on a pressure group for financing political advertising and making endorsements. The pressure group uses its power over the purse to influence the position chosen by the candidate. Nevertheless, when uninformed voters use a strategic rule of thumb, pressure-group contributions always move the outcome of the election closer to the median voter. By using such a rule of thumb, when there is advertising, uninformed voters can have the same influence on the election as informed voters.