Endogenous Constitutions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea
• 署名单位: University of Urbino; Princeton University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02309.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1-39
• 关键词: POLITICAL-ECONOMY; income; provision; POLICY; rules; GOODS; MODEL

摘要

We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. We show that a consensual system turns out to be preferred by society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is relatively high. We also find that consensual democracies should be expected to be ruled more often by centre-left coalitions while the right should have an advantage in majoritarian constitutions. The implications for the relationship between inequality and redistribution are discussed. Historical evidence and a cross-sectional analysis support our results.