Market Power in an Exhaustible Resource Market: The Case of Storable Pollution Permits

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Liski, Matti; Montero, Juan-Pablo
• 署名单位: Aalto University; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02366.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 116-144
• 关键词: Collusion; banking

摘要

Motivated by the structure of existing pollution permit markets, we study the equilibrium path that results from allocating an initial stock of storable permits to an agent, or a group of agents, in a position to exercise market power. A large seller of permits exercises market power no differently than a large supplier of an exhaustible resource. However, whenever the large agent's endowment falls short of his efficient endowment - allocation profile that would exactly cover his emissions along the perfectly competitive path - market power is greatly mitigated by a commitment problem, much like in a durable-goods monopoly. We illustrate our theory with two applications: the US sulphur market and the international carbon market that may eventually develop beyond the Kyoto Protocol.