The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cabrales, Antonio; Hauk, Esther
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02390.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 58-88
• 关键词: slow growth; OIL; ELECTIONS; ECONOMICS; CONFLICT; diamonds; WEALTH

摘要

We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources, which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction that policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with weak institutions. It also suggests that for bad political institutions human capital depends negatively on natural resources, while for high institutional quality the dependence is reversed. This finding is corroborated in cross-section regressions.