One Dollar, One Vote

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Karabarbounis, Loukas
• 署名单位: University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02406.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 621-651
• 关键词: POLITICAL-ECONOMY; income-distribution; social-mobility; Pressure groups; panel-data; INEQUALITY; size; redistribution; GROWTH; institutions

摘要

This article revisits the relationship between inequality and redistribution in a panel of advanced OECD countries. Using panel data methods that hold constant a variety of determinants of redistributive spending, I find a non-monotonic relationship between pre-tax-and-transfer distribution of income and redistribution. Relative to mean income, a more affluent rich and middle class are associated with less redistribution and a richer poor class is associated with more redistribution. These results are consistent with a one dollar, one vote politico-economic equilibrium: when the income of a group of citizens increases, aggregate redistributive policies tilt towards this group's most preferred policies.