On the Optimality of Clickthrough Fees in Online Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baye, Michael R.; Gao, Xiaxun; Morgan, John
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; University System of Ohio; Miami University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02468.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: F340-F367
• 关键词: information gatekeepers; price dispersion; COMPETITION; internet; search; MODEL; sellers; auction; worth

摘要

We study optimal fee setting decisions by a monopoly online platform connecting advertisers with potential buyers in two environments: a simple model that captures stylised features of advertising on search engines, social networks and advertisement-supported email; and a richer model that is more relevant for directed search at price comparison sites. While the platform can choose to charge for both impressions and clicks, we show that the platform maximises profits by using clickthrough fees exclusively. Our model offers a rationale for the evolving practice of relying purely on clickthrough fees for revenues in many online advertising markets.