Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Engelmann, Dirk; Grimm, Veronika
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; University of Copenhagen; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; University of Erlangen Nuremberg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02515.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1010-1041
• 关键词: minorities

摘要

In games of conflict, players typically have an incentive to exaggerate their interests. This concerns issues ranging from negotiations between political parties to conflict resolution within marriages. We experimentally study this problem using a simple voting game where information about preferences is private. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences. The exogenous linking mechanism by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains. Repeated interaction in various settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve, leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only when players can choose their partners.