Which Way to Cooperate

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kaplan, Todd R.; Ruffle, Bradley J.
• 署名单位: University of Exeter; University of Haifa; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02485.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1042-1068
• 关键词: rational cooperation; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; weakest-link; INFORMATION; strategies; collusion; shot

摘要

We introduce a two-player, binary-choice game in which both players have a privately known incentive to enter, yet the combined surplus is highest if only one enters. Repetition of this game admits two distinct ways to cooperate: turn taking and cutoffs, which rely on the player's private value to entry. A series of experiments highlights the role of private information in determining which mode players adopt. If an individual's entry values vary little (e.g. mundane tasks), taking turns is likely; if these potential values are diverse (e.g. difficult tasks that differentiate individuals by skill or preferences), cutoff cooperation emerges.