Uncertainty, Electoral Incentives and Political Myopia

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bonfiglioli, Alessandra; Gancia, Gino
• 署名单位: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12029
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 373-400
• 关键词: status-quo bias; ECONOMY; ELECTIONS; panel; ACCOUNTABILITY; performance; bureaucrats; resistance; deficits; REFORM

摘要

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability with informational frictions and uncertainty. When politicians' ability is ex ante unknown and policy choices are unobservable, elections improve political accountability and selection. However, incumbents underinvest in costly policies with future returns to signal high ability and increase re-election probability. Surprisingly, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may increase social welfare. We also address the socially optimal political rewards and the desirability of a one-term limit. Our predictions are consistent with several stylised facts and with a new empirical observation: aggregate uncertainty is positively correlated with fiscal discipline.