Unemployment Insurance, Wage Dynamics and Inequality Over the Life Cycle

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bingley, Paul; Cappellari, Lorenzo; Westergard-Nielsen, Niels
• 署名单位: Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; Aarhus University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12027
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 341-372
• 关键词: earnings instability; UNITED-STATES; EMPLOYMENT; GROWTH; variance; duration; tax

摘要

We investigate the relationship between life cycle wages and individual membership of unemployment insurance schemes in Denmark. We separate permanent from transitory wages and characterise them using membership of unemployment insurance funds. We find that unemployment insurance is associated with lower wage growth heterogeneity over the life cycle and greater wage instability, changing the nature of wage inequality from permanent to transitory. Although we are in general unable to formally test for moral hazard against adverse selection into unemployment insurance, robustness checks suggest that moral hazard is the relevant interpretation.