POLICY ANNOUNCEMENTS AND WELFARE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lepetyuk, Vadym; Stoltenberg, Christian A.
• 署名单位: Universitat d'Alacant; University of Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12024
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 962-997
• 关键词: social value; monopolistic competition; consumption inequality; limited commitment; equity premium; INFORMATION; RISK; equilibrium

摘要

We show that in the presence of idiosyncratic risk, the public revelation of information about risky aggregate outcomes such as policy choices can have a welfare-reducing effect. By announcing information on non-insurable aggregate risk, the policy maker distorts households' incentives for insurance of idiosyncratic risk and increases the riskiness of the optimal self-enforceable allocation. The negative effect of distorted insurance incentives can be quantitatively important for a monetary authority that reveals changes in its short-run inflation target. We characterise parameters for which the effect dominates conventional effects that favour releasing better information.