REPLACING TRUST WITH CONTROL: A FIELD TEST OF MOTIVATION CROWD OUT THEORY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bengtsson, Niklas; Engstrom, Per
• 署名单位: Uppsala University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12049
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 833-858
• 关键词: hidden costs; public-goods; Work effort; altruism; ORGANIZATIONS; incentives; management; AGENCY; pay

摘要

Results in behavioural economics suggest that material incentives can crowd out motivation if agents are mission-oriented rather than self-interested. We test this prediction on a sample of non-profit organisations in Sweden. Traditionally, contracts with the main principal (the Swedish foreign aid agency) have been based on trust and self-regulation. We designed a randomised policy experiment, effectively replacing the trust-based contract with an increased level of monitoring from the principal. Overall, using both self-reported and observed measures of outreach, we find that the intervention increased outreach, reduced expenditures and reduced the number of financial irregularities.