MOBILE TERMINATION, NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hurkens, Sjaak; Lopez, Angel L.
• 署名单位: Barcelona School of Economics; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12097
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1005-1039
• 关键词: competition; telecommunications; interconnection; price; intermediation; compatibility; access; MARKET; MODEL; bill

摘要

We re-examine the literature on mobile termination in the presence of network externalities. Externalities arise when firms discriminate between on and off-net calls or when subscription demand is elastic. This literature predicts that profit decreases and consumer surplus increases when termination charges increase. This is puzzling as in reality regulators are pushing termination rates down while being opposed to do so by network operators. This puzzle is resolved when consumers' expectations are assumed passive but required to be fulfilled in equilibrium, as defined by Katz and Shapiro (1985), instead of being responsive to non-equilibrium prices, as assumed until now.