PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN INPUT MARKETS: QUANTITY DISCOUNTS AND PRIVATE INFORMATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Herweg, Fabian; Mueller, Daniel
• 署名单位: University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12061
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 776-804
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; vertical control; robinson-patman; welfare; output; EFFICIENCY; CONTRACTS

摘要

We consider a monopolistic supplier's optimal choice of wholesale tariffs when downstream firms are privately informedabout their retail costs. Under discriminatory pricing, downstream firms that differ in their ex ante distribution of retail costs are offered different tariffs. Under uniform pricing, the same wholesale tariff is offered to all downstream firms. In contrast to the extant literature on price discrimination with non-linear wholesale tariffs, we find that banning discriminatory wholesale contracts often improves welfare. This also holds if the manufacturer is not an unconstrained monopolist. Moreover, uniform pricing increases downstream investments in cost reduction in the long run.