Equality Under Threat by the Talented: Evidence from Worker-Managed Firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Burdin, Gabriel
• 署名单位: Universidad de la Republica, Uruguay; University of Siena
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12272
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1372-1403
• 关键词: productivity; incentives; regression; ECONOMICS; earnings; taxation; kibbutz; unions; wages; LABOR

摘要

Does workplace democracy engender greater pay equality? Are high-ability individuals more likely to quit egalitarian organisational regimes? The article revisits this long-standing issue by analysing the interplay between compensation structure and quit behaviour in the distinct yet underexplored institutional setting of worker-managed firms. The analysis is based on novel administrative data sources, which allow constructing a simple ordinal measure of the workers' ability type. The article's key findings are that worker-managed firms have a more compressed compensation structure than conventional firms, and high-ability members are more likely than other members to exit.