INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN CONTESTS: A BAYESIAN PERSUASION APPROACH

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhang, Jun; Zhou, Junjie
• 署名单位: University of Technology Sydney; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12277
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 2197-2217
• 关键词: Rent-seeking

摘要

We examine optimal information disclosure through Bayesian persuasion in a two-player contest. One contestant's valuation is commonly known and the other's is his private information. The contest organiser can precommit to a signal to influence the uninformed contestant's belief about the informed contestant. We show that to search for the optimal signal when the informed contestant's valuation follows a binary distribution, it is without loss of generality to compare no disclosure with full disclosure; otherwise, such a restriction causes loss of generality. We propose a simple method to compute the optimal signal, which yields explicit solutions in some situations.