Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ettinger, David; Michelucci, Fabio
• 署名单位: Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12243
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1484-1502
• 关键词: price

摘要

We analyse a rationale for hiding information in open ascending auction formats. We focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information by observing the exact dropout values of the opponents who exit the auction. We show that the decision whether to allow jump bids or not can have a drastic impact on revenue and efficiency.