A THEORY OF PROTEST VOTING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Myatt, David P.
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12333
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1527-1567
• 关键词: regime change; Presidential elections; private information; electoral systems; signaling model; global games; COORDINATION; VOTE; turnout; equilibria

摘要

The supporters of a mainstream candidate contemplate voting for a special-issue minority party (which risks opening the door to a disliked opponent) in order to influence mainstream policy. Protest voting reacts negatively to expectations about others' enthusiasm for the protest issue, more so if the candidate learns from the protest and responds endogenously. I find that electoral support for single-issue protest parties can be negatively related to the true underlying enthusiasm for their causes. The risk that the candidate loses office are maximised when the expected enthusiasm for the protest issue makes the candidate indifferent ex ante to accepting the protesters' demands.