TAXING EXTERNALITIES UNDER FINANCING CONSTRAINTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoffmann, Florian; Inderst, Roman; Moslener, Ulf
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; Goethe University Frankfurt; Imperial College London; Frankfurt School Finance & Management
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12396
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2478-2503
• 关键词: Optimal taxation; extended liability; income taxation

摘要

We consider a production economy with externalities, which can be reduced by additional firm-level expenditures. This requires firms to raise additional outside financing, leading to deadweight loss due to a standard agency problem vis-a-vis investors. Policy is constrained as firms are privately informed about marginal abatement costs. The optimal tax on externalities is non-linear, thus, not implementable through tradable pollution rights alone, and lower than the Pigouvian tax for two reasons: first, higher outside financing creates additional deadweight loss; second, tax-induced reallocation of resources reduces average productive efficiency. Combining taxes with grants tied to loans improves resource allocation and, thus, welfare.