Interim partially correlated rationalizability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tang, Qianfeng
• 署名单位: Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.012
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 36-44
• 关键词: Games with incomplete information; rationalizability; Hierarchies of beliefs

摘要

We formalize a solution concept called interim partially correlated rationalizability (IPCR), which was implicitly discussed in both Ely and Peski (2006) and Dekel et al. (2007). IPCR allows for interim correlations, i.e., correlations that depend on opponents' types but not on the state of nature. As a direct extension of Ely and Peski's main result, we show that hierarchies of beliefs over conditional beliefs are necessary and sufficient for the identification of IPCR. We use new proof techniques that better illustrate the connection between higher order beliefs and interim rationalizability. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc All rights reserved.