Extremism in revolutionary movements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shadmehr, Mehdi
• 署名单位: Princeton University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.003
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 97-121
• 关键词: revolution; Revolutionary entrepreneurs; Extremism; repression; Repression backlash; COMPETITION

摘要

A revolutionary entrepreneur strategically chooses the revolutionary agenda to maximize the likelihood of revolution. Citizens have different preferences and can contribute varying degrees of support. We show: (1) Extremists exert a disproportionate influence over the revolutionary agenda; (2) Depending on the structure of repression, more severe repression can moderate or radicalize the revolutionary agenda. Specifically, increases in the minimum punishment (marginal cost of revolutionary effort at its minimum) radicalize the revolutionary agenda. This presents the elite with a tradeoff between extreme but unlikely revolutions and moderate but likely ones. (3) Competition between revolutionary entrepreneurs can radicalize the revolutionary agenda. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.