A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE COMBINATORIAL CLOCK AUCTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Baranov, Oleg
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12404
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: F334-F350
• 关键词: design

摘要

The combinatorial clock auction (CCA) is an important recent innovation in auction design that has been utilised for many spectrum auctions worldwide. While the theoretical foundations of the CCA are described in a growing literature, many of the practical implementation choices are neglected. In this article, we examine some of the most critical practical decisions for a regulator implementing the CCA. Topics include: implementation of reserve prices; endogenous band plans; supplementary round activity rules; competition policy; bidding languages; and allocation of the core burden. We illustrate our discussion with examples from recent spectrum auctions that used the CCA format.