SELF-PERPETUATION OF POLITICAL POWER

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rossi, Martin A.
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12443
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: F455-F473
• 关键词: incumbency advantage; careers

摘要

I investigate the relationship between tenure length in the House and posterior political success. I exploit a natural experiment in the Argentine Congress - where terms length were assigned randomly after the return to democracy - that provides a source of exogenous variation to initial political power. I find that having a longer tenure in the House increases both the probability of moving to higher political positions and the probability of having a relative in future congresses. I also find that name recognition is a mechanism behind dynastic success. Finally, I report a negative correlation between being a dynastic legislator and political effort.