ORGANISED CRIME, INSIDER INFORMATION AND OPTIMAL LENIENCY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Piccolo, Salvatore; Immordino, Giovanni
• 署名单位: Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; University of Naples Federico II
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12382
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2504-2524
• 关键词: optimal law-enforcement; PROGRAMS; PROSECUTION; deterrence; extortion; cartels

摘要

When 'low-rank' criminals are offered to cooperate with justice in exchange of judicial leniency, their information generates ex post rents that may actually favour their bosses and increase the crime profitability. Hence, an optimal leniency policy must trade off the positive impact of helpful disclosure of insider information and the positive externality that these rents exert on the organisation's returns from crime. Due to this tension, the amnesty that minimises the probability of crime induces the Legislator to restrict the access to the programme, by excluding informants owning potentially useful knowledge. This result survives to a number of robustness checks.