Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Australian National University; Yale University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12400
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2041-2065
• 关键词: price-competition; EFFICIENCY; search

摘要

We analyse a model in which agents make investments and match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath etal. () showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium investments are generally inefficient. We work here with a more structured and tractable model to analyse investment inefficiencies. We provide conditions under which investment is inefficiently high or low and when changes in the pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus will be Pareto improving, and examine how the degree of heterogeneity on either side of the market affects investment efficiency.