The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lahkar, Ratul; Riedel, Frank
• 署名单位: Ashoka University; University of Bielefeld
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.009
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 268-282
• 关键词: Logit dynamic; potential games; Negative semidefinite games

摘要

We define the logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets and establish its fundamental properties, namely, the existence of a logit equilibrium, its convergence to a Nash equilibrium as the perturbation factor becomes small, and existence, uniqueness and continuity of solution trajectories. We apply the dynamic to the analysis of potential games and negative semidefinite games. We show that in a restricted state space of probability measures with bounded density functions, solution trajectories of the logit dynamic converge to logit equilibria in these two classes of games. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.