POLITICAL DYNASTIES, ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICIANS' HUMAN CAPITAL

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Geys, Benny
• 署名单位: BI Norwegian Business School
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12444
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: F474-F494
• 关键词: italian municipalities; educated leaders; FAMILY; performance; ELECTIONS; networks; FIRMS; TIES; entry

摘要

This article focuses on political dynasties' potential consequences, and particularly investigates whether and when they lead to the selection of dynastic politicians with relatively lower education levels. I exploit the different electoral constraints faced by distinct subsets of Italian local politicians to identify whether weaker constraints on political selection processes induce the selection of dynastic politicians with lower education levels relative to their non-dynastic peers. The analysis which covers almost 540,000 Italian local politicians active during the period 1985-2012 - indicates that a political selection process controlled by politicians rather than the electorate favours dynastic individuals with relatively lower levels of education.