The Non-equivalence of Labour Market Taxes: A Real-effort Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Weber, Matthias; Schram, Arthur
• 署名单位: Bank of Lithuania; Vilnius University; University of Amsterdam; European University Institute
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12365
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2187-2215
• 关键词: liability-side equivalence; public-goods; individual behavior; field experiment; Group membership; income-tax; SALIENCE; MODEL; hypothesis; experience

摘要

Under full rationality, a labour market tax levied on employers and a corresponding income tax levied on employees are equivalent. With boundedly rational agents, this equivalence is no longer obvious. In a real-effort experiment, we study the effects of these taxes on preferences concerning the size of the public sector, subjective well-being, labour supply and on-the-job performance. Our findings suggest that employer-side taxes induce preferences for a larger public sector. Subjective well-being is higher under employer-side taxes while labour supply is lower, at least at the extensive margin. We discuss three mechanisms that may underlie these results.