DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL LENGTH OF REGULATORY GUARANTEE: A LENGTH-OF-CONTRACT AUCTION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Greve, Thomas; Pollitt, Michael G.
署名单位：
University of Cambridge
刊物名称：
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ISSN/ISSBN：
0013-0133
DOI：
10.1111/ecoj.12405
发表日期：
2017
页码：
F325-F333
关键词：
摘要：
We present an auction design to be used in the area of procurement that allows the length of the regulatory funding period to be determined via an auction. It allows bidders to submit bids against a payment for periods of varying lengths, say 25 and 30 years, instead of a fixed 20-year contract. This can be desirable for securing more favourable terms in financial markets. It yields efficiency and delivers the optimal length of contract, defined as where social value is maximised. The auction is applicable to any infrastructure investment such as energy, transportation or any area that uses contracts.