THE GERMAN 4G SPECTRUM AUCTION: DESIGN AND BEHAVIOUR

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cramton, Peter; Ockenfels, Axel
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12406
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: F305-F324
• 关键词: Multiunit auctions; resale opportunities; demand reduction; price; uncertainty; carbon; INFORMATION; COOPERATION; electricity; RECIPROCITY

摘要

The 2010 German 4G spectrum auction was an unusually large simultaneous ascending multi-band auction. The bidding was competitive and the final assignment was efficient. However, our analysis suggests that independent and rational bidders had an opportunity to coordinate implicitly on a low-revenue outcome. Coordination was difficult, though, because of a multiplicity of focal points. One important focal point involved post-auction negotiations, posing risks to bidders and the auctioneer. We analyse different bidding scenarios and how post-auction negotiations can affect values, bidding and efficiency. We also discuss how the simultaneous ascending auction format can be augmented to mitigate the risks.