Optimal Life-cycle Capital Taxation under Self-control Problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pavoni, Nicola; Yazici, Hakki
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Sabanci University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12323
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1188-1216
• 关键词: delayed rewards; time-inconsistent; Sin taxes; span; consumption; temptation; ECONOMICS; AGE

摘要

We study optimal taxation of savings in an economy where agents face self-control problems and the severity of these problems possibly depends on age. Focusing on quasi-hyperbolic discounting, we show that if agents' ability to self-control increases concavely with age, then savings should be subsidised and the subsidy should decrease with age. Quantitatively, we find that the optimal subsidies in our calibrated model with age-dependent self-control are much larger than those implied by models with constant self-control. Our optimal subsidies are of comparable magnitudes to those implied by the 401(k) plan, even though the latter prescribes subsidies increasing with age.